In this series, we are exploring structural similarities between the concept of Soul in Plotinus’ Enneads and Vimarśa in Utpaladeva’s ĪPK. In the previous post, this centered on the dynamic relationship these concepts have to consciousness, in that they proceed from and reflect back upon the principle of consciousness. This relationship implies a further structural similarity: the immateriality of Soul and Vimarśa. Both Plotinus and Utpaladeva think through their respective concepts as immaterial in response to other philosophical schools (Stoicism, Epicureanism; Sāṃkhya).
Both Soul and Vimarśa serve as the locus of different cognitive activities for Plotinus and for Utpaladeva. This includes, as was mentioned in the previous post, memory (ĪPK I.4.1), as well as volition and will, among others (cf. Plotinus on Aristotle’s De Anima in O’Meara 1996, 16). Because these concepts serve in Plotinus and Utpaladeva’s thought as a basis for acts of cognition, both authors are motivated to present them as immaterial. Their arguments for immateriality are directed against both contemporaneous and historical opponents, at times explicitly named or at times implied.
For Plotinus, the primary concern is to demonstrate that Soul is neither itself a body (sōma), by which he means matter (hulē) having been given shape, nor derivative of a body. Much of this is established in the longer, polemical sections of En. IV.6-7 (“if there is memory … it would be impossible if soul were to be a body; εἰ δὲ ἔστι τὸ μνημονεύειν … ἀδύνατον τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι En. IV.6.35-45, my translation) directed primarily at Stoicism and Aristotelian hylomorphism. However, Plotinus also locates the immateriality of Soul in non-polemical contexts. For example, in his exegesis of the Hesiodic account of the birth of Heavenly Aphrodite, he argues she does not descend into matter on account of her “motherlessness” (En. III.5.2.24-25).
Similarly, in describing what Silvia Schwarz Linder calls the “inner dynamics of the godhead polarized in its masculine and feminine aspects,’ (Schwarz Linder 2022, 102) Utpaladeva modifies and distances himself from a well-established polarization – Puruṣa and Prakṛti – of Sāṃkhya philosophy. He reinforces the immateriality of Vimarśa by describing it as the volition (icchā) of the Lord and sentience (caitanyam) of the Self. For the former, Utpaladeva argues that volition could not exist if objects of consciousness were not already “shining”, i.e. present to, consciousness (vṛtti on ĪPK I.5.10 and vṛtti: Utpaladeva explains icchāmarśaḥ pravartate (ĪPK I.5.10) as vimarśa icchārupo … syāt). For the latter, his premises include understanding Vimarśa as the “essential nature” (svabhāva, ĪPK I.5.11) and “primary essence” (literally, primary self) of Prakāśa (prakāśāsya mukhya ātmā pratyavamarśaḥ, vṛtti on ĪPK I.5.11). Utpaladeva concludes from these, that “[p]recisely for this reason the self has been defined as sentience (ātmāta eva caitanyaṃ, ĪPK I.5.12). At both the transcendent consciousness of Maheśvara and individual cognitive activity, Utpaladeva provides an alternative to thinking of the feminine ‘pole’ (to use Schwarz Linder’s term, describing Vimarśa) as solely corresponding to prime matter (pradhāna, which Utpala in ĪPK III.1.10-11 ties to cognizable reality, and makes derivative of Māyā in ĪPK I.5.18) ontologically distinct from Puruṣa.
Further, Utpaladeva’s vṛtti on ĪPK I.5.11 seems to be an implict response to the conception of Puruṣa in Sāṃkhyakārikā 19:
“It is the witness. It is solitary, neutral. It is the seer. It does nothing.” (kaivalyaṃ mādhyasthyaṃ draṣṭṛtvam akartṛ-bhāvaś ca) (Chapple 2024).
To which Utpaladeva replies:
“In the absence of reflective awareness, light, through objects make it assume different forms, would be merely ‘limpid,’ but not sentient, since there is no ‘savouring’ (na tvajāḍyaṃ camatkṛterabhāvāt)” (Torella 2021).
The primary distinction Utpaladeva wants to point to between his understanding of Prakāśa -joined-with-Vimarśa and the SK depiction of Puruṣa concerns activity. Through reflective awareness, consciousness is engaged in an activity (camatkāra, from the root kṛ, “do, make”), unlike the non-doing (akartṛ, a-kṛ, “not”+”do, make”) of the SK witness-consciousnes
In conclusion, in differentiating themselves from existing schools and perspectives, Plotinus and Utpaladeva analogously develop a conception of these two principles as non-material entities. This parallel development in a polemical context is one instance of Just’s explanation for the ‘structural hypothesis’ – that similarities between Neoplatonic and Kashmiri Śaivism develop in response to similar external critiques (Just 2013, 23).
(Stay tuned for Part 3 on causality for Utpaladeva and Plotinus!)
References
Chapple, Key Chapple (2024), The Sāṃkhya System: Account for the Real. Suny Series in Hindu Studies. (Albany: State University of New York Press).
Henry, Paul and Schwyzer, Hans-Rudolf (eds.) (1964-1983), Plotini Opera. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Vol. I-III.
Just, Michal. (2013) “Neoplatonism and Paramādvaita”, Comparative Philosophy 4.2. 1-28.
O’Meara, Dominic J. (1995), Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Schwarz Linder, Silvia (2022), Goddess Traditions in India: Theological Poems and Philosophical Tales in the Tripurārahasya. (New York: Routledge).
Torella, Raffaele (2021) (Tr.), The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author’s Vṛtti: Critical Edition and Annotated Translation. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).