{"id":46,"date":"2026-06-05T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-06-05T07:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/?p=46"},"modified":"2026-05-29T11:23:20","modified_gmt":"2026-05-29T09:23:20","slug":"soul-and-vimarsa-between-plotinus-and-utpaladeva-part-2-immateriality","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/2026\/06\/05\/soul-and-vimarsa-between-plotinus-and-utpaladeva-part-2-immateriality\/","title":{"rendered":"Soul and Vimar\u015ba between Plotinus and Utpaladeva (Part 2: Immateriality)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In this series, we are exploring structural similarities between the concept of Soul in Plotinus\u2019 Enneads <\/em>and Vimar\u015ba in Utpaladeva\u2019s \u012aPK<\/em>. In the previous post, this centered on the dynamic relationship these concepts have to consciousness, in that they proceed from and reflect back upon the principle of consciousness. This relationship implies a further structural similarity: the immateriality of Soul and Vimar\u015ba. Both Plotinus and Utpaladeva think through their respective concepts as immaterial in response to other philosophical schools (Stoicism, Epicureanism; S\u0101\u1e43khya).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both Soul and Vimar\u015ba serve as the locus of different cognitive activities for Plotinus and for Utpaladeva. This includes, as was mentioned in the previous post, memory (\u012aPK <\/em>I.4.1), as well as volition and will, among others (cf. Plotinus on Aristotle\u2019s De Anima<\/em> in O\u2019Meara 1996, 16). Because these concepts serve in Plotinus and Utpaladeva\u2019s thought as a basis for acts of cognition, both authors are motivated to present them as immaterial. Their arguments for immateriality are directed against both contemporaneous and historical opponents, at times explicitly named or at times implied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Plotinus, the primary concern is to demonstrate that Soul is neither itself a body (s\u014dma<\/em>), by which he means matter (hul\u0113<\/em>) having been given shape, nor derivative of a body. Much of this is established in the longer, polemical sections of En. <\/em>IV.6-7 (\u201cif there is memory \u2026 it would be impossible if soul were to be a body; \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd … \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 En. <\/em>IV.6.35-45, my translation) directed primarily at Stoicism and Aristotelian hylomorphism. However, Plotinus also locates the immateriality of Soul in non-polemical contexts. For example, in his exegesis of the Hesiodic account of the birth of Heavenly Aphrodite, he argues she does not descend into matter on account of her \u201cmotherlessness\u201d (En. <\/em>III.5.2.24-25).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similarly, in describing what Silvia Schwarz Linder calls the \u201cinner dynamics of the godhead polarized in its masculine and feminine aspects,\u2019 (Schwarz Linder 2022, 102) Utpaladeva modifies and distances himself from a well-established polarization \u2013 Puru\u1e63a <\/em>and Prak\u1e5bti <\/em>\u2013 of S\u0101\u1e43khya philosophy. He reinforces the immateriality of Vimar\u015ba by describing it as the volition (icch\u0101<\/em>) of the Lord and sentience (caitanyam<\/em>) of the Self. For the former, Utpaladeva argues that volition could not exist if objects of consciousness were not already \u201cshining\u201d, i.e. present to, consciousness (v\u1e5btti on \u012aPK <\/em>I.5.10 and v\u1e5btti: Utpaladeva explains icch\u0101mar\u015ba\u1e25 pravartate (\u012aPK<\/em> I.5.10) as vimar\u015ba icch\u0101rupo \u2026 sy\u0101t). For the latter, his premises include understanding Vimar\u015ba as the \u201cessential nature\u201d (svabh\u0101va, \u012aPK <\/em>I.5.11) and \u201cprimary essence\u201d (literally, primary self) of Prak\u0101\u015ba (prak\u0101\u015b\u0101sya mukhya \u0101tm\u0101<\/strong> pratyavamar\u015ba\u1e25, v\u1e5btti on \u012aPK <\/em>I.5.11). Utpaladeva concludes from these, that \u201c[p]recisely for this reason the self has been defined as sentience (\u0101tm\u0101ta eva caitanya\u1e43, \u012aPK <\/em>I.5.12). At both the transcendent consciousness of Mahe\u015bvara and individual cognitive activity, Utpaladeva provides an alternative to thinking of the feminine \u2018pole\u2019 (to use Schwarz Linder\u2019s term, describing Vimar\u015ba) as solely corresponding to prime matter (pradh\u0101na<\/em>, which Utpala in \u012aPK <\/em>III.1.10-11 ties to cognizable reality, and makes derivative of M\u0101y\u0101 in \u012aPK <\/em>I.5.18) ontologically distinct from Puru\u1e63a.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Further, Utpaladeva\u2019s v\u1e5btti on \u012aPK <\/em>I.5.11 seems to be an implict response to the conception of Puru\u1e63a in S\u0101\u1e43khyak\u0101rik\u0101<\/em> 19:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIt is the witness. It is solitary, neutral. It is the seer. It does nothing.\u201d (kaivalya\u1e43 m\u0101dhyasthya\u1e43 dra\u1e63\u1e6d\u1e5btvam akart\u1e5b-bh\u0101va\u015b ca) (Chapple 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To which Utpaladeva replies:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIn the absence of reflective awareness, light, through objects make it assume different forms, would be merely \u2018limpid,\u2019 but not sentient, since there is no \u2018savouring\u2019<\/strong> (na tvaj\u0101\u1e0dya\u1e43 camatk\u1e5bterabh\u0101v\u0101t)\u201d (Torella 2021).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The primary distinction Utpaladeva wants to point to between his understanding of Prak\u0101\u015ba -joined-with-Vimar\u015ba and the SK <\/em>depiction of Puru\u1e63a concerns activity. Through reflective awareness, consciousness is engaged in an activity (camatk\u0101ra<\/strong>, from the root k\u1e5b, \u201cdo, make\u201d), unlike the non-doing (akart\u1e5b, a-k\u1e5b, \u201cnot\u201d+\u201ddo, make\u201d) of the SK <\/em>witness-consciousnes<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In conclusion, in differentiating themselves from existing schools and perspectives, Plotinus and Utpaladeva analogously develop a conception of these two principles as non-material entities. This parallel development in a polemical context is one instance of Just\u2019s explanation for the \u2018structural hypothesis\u2019 – that similarities between Neoplatonic and Kashmiri \u015aaivism develop in response to similar external critiques (Just 2013, 23).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

(Stay tuned for Part 3 on causality for Utpaladeva and Plotinus!)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chapple, Key Chapple (2024), The S\u0101\u1e43khya System: Account for the Real<\/em>. Suny Series in Hindu Studies. (Albany: State University of New York Press).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Henry, Paul and Schwyzer, Hans-Rudolf (eds.) (1964-1983), Plotini Opera<\/em>. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Vol. I-III.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Just, Michal. (2013) \u201cNeoplatonism and Param\u0101dvaita\u201d, Comparative Philosophy 4.2. 1-28.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

O\u2019Meara, Dominic J. (1995), Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads<\/em>. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Schwarz Linder, Silvia (2022), Goddess Traditions in India: Theological Poems and Philosophical Tales in the Tripur\u0101rahasya<\/em>. (New York: Routledge).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Torella, Raffaele (2021) (Tr.), The \u012a\u015bvarapratyabhij\u00f1\u0101k\u0101rik\u0101 of Utpaladeva with the Author\u2019s V\u1e5btti: Critical Edition and Annotated Translation<\/em>. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In this series, we are exploring structural similarities between the concept of Soul in Plotinus\u2019 Enneads and Vimar\u015ba in Utpaladeva\u2019s \u012aPK. In the previous post, this centered on the dynamic relationship these concepts have to consciousness, in that they proceed from and reflect back upon the principle of consciousness. This relationship implies a further structural…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"pagelayer_contact_templates":[],"_pagelayer_content":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[22,17,23,3,18,21],"class_list":["post-46","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-aesthetics","tag-comparative-philosophy","tag-kashmiri-shaivism","tag-plotinus","tag-tantra","tag-utpaladeva"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/46","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=46"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/46\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":49,"href":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/46\/revisions\/49"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=46"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=46"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/guskraus.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=46"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}