As has become clear through the other points of comparison, Vimarśa and Soul are both immanent and transcendent principles. They refer both the individual and universal modes, or perhaps microcosmic and macrocosmic registers, of consciousness, within what Just calls “multilevelled subjectivity:”
“…the topic of multilevelled subjectivity was at the centre of philosophical attention in India for centuries before Plotinus. And it reached conclusions very similar to Plotinus, which were developed in notions of saṃskāra (the memory trace of experience) and vāsana (its contracted form, empowered by direct influence on the behavior of the mind) as tools for describing the determinative function of the unconscious mind, or notions of ātman (the Soul, in its highest most general form), buddhi (intellect), ahaṃkāra (the ego sense), manas (mind), as tools for describing the cognitive structure of consciousness from sense perceptions right up to the “metaconsciousness” of the pure reflectivity of ātman. Paramādvaita authors merely took some part of this heritage, although in some instances with some doctrinal adjustments. […] the ego, was dichotomized into the artificial “I-ness” (kṛtrimā ahaṃtā) and pure “I-ness” (pūrṇāhaṃtā) […] the latter is, in fact, the subjective side of the absolute and therefore, in a way, the subjective top of the epistemico-ontological hierarchy.” (Just 2013, 15)
For Plotinus individuals have an individual soul, and for Utpaladeva individuals have their own reflective awareness. For both authors, this does not contradict their conception of a higher register of Soul or Vimarśa, respectively united with Nous or Prakāśa. Crucially, these multiple layers of subjectivity within a dynamic procession from a first principle allow both Plotinus and Utpaladeva to explain imperfection and error on the part of individuals without attributing such qualities or actions to a transcendent principle.
Utpaladeva makes clear that Mahesvara has a perfect reflective awareness (ĪPK I.8.4), but is willing to explore how other instances of Vimarśa may be intermixed with erroneous cognition. Firstly, he preempts a Buddhist objection to the use of the term aham, granting that one who uses the term “I” when reflecting on their body is, indeed, talking about an aggregate (vikalpa) and not a substance (ĪPK I.6.4-5). Secondly, he explains how the limited, sequential cognitions of an individual can lead to erroneous cognitions– which are nevertheless Vimarśa – and which are replaced by subsequently correct cognitions. He uses the example of misapprehension of mother-of-pearl as silver (rajata), saying that:
“[e]ven if the cognitions as ‘silver’ of real silver and of mother-of-pearl are in themselves equally real, insofar as in them the reflective awareness ‘silver’ is the same (rajatā vamarśaikyena), however the cognition ‘this is silver’ referring to mother-of-pearl is to be considered erroneous because of the impermanence (asthairyāt), since it is not congruent as regards the accessory quality – place […]” (ĪPK vṛtti on II.3.13)
The reflective awareness of ‘silver’ is always real, insofar that “the Ancient One […] whose nature is perennially manifest [is] inherent in every cognition” (ĪPK II.3.15-16). Error concerns not the cognition of silver, but the quality of place implied in “this.” Such a quality depends on impermanence (asthairya); Maheshvara, not being subject to such impermanence, has perfect reflective awareness (sa eva vimarśattvena niyatena maheśvara ĪPK I.8.11).
Plotinus’ exploration of how Soul becomes involved in error is also an account of misapprehension, though explored in the context of aesthetics and ethics rather than epistemology. He explains that the Eros within the individual soul is directed towards beauty “of some kind,” (καλῷ τινι, En. III.5.1.11) but admits that this one desire (ἡ ἔφεσις αὕτη, En. III.5.1.12) appears differently in “self-controlled people who have been made to have an affinity with beauty itself” as opposed to one who “seeks to find its consummation in the performance of some base act” (ἡ δὲ καὶ τελευτᾶν ἐθέλει εἰς αἰσχροῦ τινος πρᾶξιν En. III.5.1.11-12).
This misidentification, rooted in “see[ing] beauty in bodies […] but [not] realiz[ing] that they are images and traces and shadows […of that] of which they are images”, (En. I.6.8.6-8) is a cause of moral error (aiskhros opposed to kalos). Plotinus maintains a continuity between the activities of individual souls and the Soul proper without attributing the former’s “fall into evil” (En. III.5.1.64) to the latter. This coheres with the prior distinctions made concerning Plotinus’ thealogy: Heavenly Aphrodite (the soul as hypostasis) has her own Eros, who is a God and who is always directed towards the Good, (En. III.5.4.23-25) while the many Aphrodites (individual souls) each have their own daimonic Eros responsible for erotic affections.
References
Gerson, Lloyd P. (ed.) (2018), The Enneads. Boys-Stones, George; Dillon, John M.; Gerson, Lloyd P.; King, R.A.H.; Smith, Andrew; Wilberding, James (trs.). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Henry, Paul and Schwyzer, Hans-Rudolf (eds.) (1964-1983), Plotini Opera. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Vol. I-III.
Just, Michal. (2013) “Neoplatonism and Paramādvaita”, Comparative Philosophy 4.2. 1-28.
Torella, Raffaele (2021) (tr.), The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author’s Vṛtti: Critical Edition and Annotated Translation. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).